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16 September 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 16 September 1969

*DD/I highlighted a recently completed study by OBGI which demonstrates that the Soviets have deliberately distorted their maps.

5X1 DDCI underlined Soviet military dependence upon maps and questioned regarding the problems this distortion would create for the Soviet military. The Director asked Goodwin and the DD/I to get together and to provide recommendations on how to surface this material. DD/I provided Goodwin with D/BGI's summary memorandum.

Godfrey noted completion of a memorandum on what areas of the world are apt to imitate the kidnaping of the U. S. Ambassador to Brazil. He went on to doubt the value of the memorandum in that it concludes such incidents could happen almost anywhere and consequently is not too helpful. He suggested that the memorandum therefore not be distributed externally.

5X1 Godfrey noted the completion of a memorandum summarizing available data on the fifteen terrorists released by Brazil.

Godfrey noted that Eldridge Cleaver has appeared in Panmunjom, where he is agitating for a number of things including a free Palestine. He noted General Bonesteel's concern.

The Director asked how he should respond to the observation that we had no advance information with respect to the coup in Libya.

5X1
5X1 D/ONE seconded the DD/P's judgment that within the intelligence community the coup was generally totally unanticipated.

In response to the Director's question D/ONE reported that NIE 11-8 will be distributed today.

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DD/S reported that commencing on 6 October influenza shots will be available, although no epidemic is anticipated.

Carver observed that the President will be making a public statement on Vietnam this morning and briefly noted that he was consulted on how best to describe GVN troop strength not on active duty.

Maury reported that DIA is testifying this morning before the full House Armed Services Committee just prior to the Director's scheduled appearance before our Subcommittee.

Houston briefed on a visit here by Lloyd Cutler, representing CBS. Cutler related that CBS is being criticized by the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee for not having consulted CIA on a story they did on Rolando Masferrer's attack against Haiti. Houston noted his advice that this matter is completely out of our jurisdiction and his suggestion to recommend that the Committee staff be referred to the FBI and customs officials. The Director concurred.

[redacted]

DD/P reported [redacted] on the likelihood and consequences of a Soviet pre-emptive strike on China.

DD/P noted that he sent Secretary Rogers a brief report in connection with the possibility that Willy Brandt may visit Washington.

Citing our inability to anticipate the Libyan coup, DD/P noted that the impact of OPRED will greatly curtail our capability to cover internal political situations throughout many areas. The Director suggested that the DD/P press this point, and the DD/P commented that he will be asking the Director to underline this diminution of our capabilities before the 2 October OPRED meeting of the Under Secretaries Committee.

DDCI reported that the 303 Committee will meet this afternoon rather than this morning, and the Director asked him to take the meeting.

*The Director asked the DD/P to draft a reply to IN 44956.

*The Director complimented [redacted], the drafter of the text of his remarks before the Air War College. He added that this speech will probably be good for his scheduled appearance before the National War College. DD/I noted that some mention of NSC matters should probably be introduced into the text, and the Director concurred. The Director asked that an appropriate rewrite be furnished shortly before the 10 October date and asked particularly that [redacted] be extended his appreciation for a job well done.

The Director asked Goodwin to assemble any press coverage of Senator Mansfield's favorable statement with respect to our noninvolvement in the Green Beret case.

Goodwin called attention to Stewart Alsop's piece in the 22 September issue of Newsweek, "Why Are the Russians Scared?" He noted that he has received no inquiries from the press on this matter but added that to his knowledge this is the first mention in the media of beehive-shaped installations in North China. The Director suggested that, if Goodwin is questioned by the press on the reported CIA/KGB cocktail party conversation, he should simply laugh it off and note that CIA and KGB officers simply do not converse at diplomatic receptions. DD/P added that he is in receipt of some report that identifies these SWARFs as guarded food storage facilities.

*The Director mentioned that he sent the DD/I a newspaper report that the ChiComs are moving nuclear facilities to Tibet. The Director added that he may be questioned on this matter and asked the DD/I to provide a report.

DDCI noted receipt of a telephone call from Scotty Reston of the New York Times asking for information on the Chou/Kosygin meeting. He added that he gave Reston a negative report and noted that the call was intended for the Director.

[redacted]

for L. K. White

*Extracted and sent to action officer

NEWSWEEK
22 SEP 1969
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BY STEWART ALSOP

WHY ARE THE RUSSIANS SCARED?

WASHINGTON—A few days before President Nixon returned to Washington last week, a major state paper was delivered to him in California. The paper gave the answer of the Board of National Estimates to this question: is there a serious danger of war between the Soviet Union and Communist China? The board's answer, in non-governmentese: indeed there is.

The paper was prepared, of course, before Soviet Premier Alexei Kosygin's surprise trip to Peking to talk with Chinese Communist Premier Chou En-lai. The Kosygin trip may—or may not—have reduced the danger, but it is evidence that the danger is taken very seriously indeed in Moscow.

The Board of National Estimates represents Washington's "intelligence community"—the CIA, plus the Pentagon's DIA, the State Department's intelligence branch, and the other bureaucracies in the immense Washington paraphernalia of intelligence. Most of the board's "national estimates" are festooned with dissents. Significantly, to this paper there were no dissents at all.

Only a few months ago, the consensus of the intelligence community was that the chances of a Sino-Soviet war, despite the bitter rhetoric on both sides, were near zero. The intermittent fighting this summer along the frontier—the Russians charge that no fewer than 488 Chinese border violations have been repulsed by the Soviet Army since June—has of course influenced the changed assessment of the danger. So has the mounting evidence, reinforced by Kosygin's trip to Peking, that the Russians themselves take the danger with deadly seriousness.

GENUINE DANGER

In recent months, to cite one example, Russian Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin has gone out of his way, not once but several times, to warn Secretary of State William Rogers that the danger of war is very real. In terms of nuclear power, air power, fire power—all forms of power except man power—the Russians are almost as superior to the Chinese as this country is to, say, the Mexicans. This raises an obvious question: why, in heaven's name, are the Russians scared of the Chinese?

According to the experts in such matters, the answer falls into four parts:

First, history. The Tartars held Russia in thrall for 240 years. Ever since, the Russian people have had a sort of folk fear of attack from the east.

Second, geography. The Trans-Siberian Railway runs in some places less than 10 miles from the Chinese border. It is the only land link between European Russia and Asiatic Russia. To cut it would be to cut Russia in two.

Third, mystery, always a component of fear. The Russians really do not know what the Chinese are up to. In the open Western countries, the KGB, the Soviet equivalent of the CIA, has an easy assignment, but in China it has more than met its match. The Soviet diplomatic mission in Peking is so isolated that it might just as well be locked up in Moscow's Lubianka prison.

WHAT ARE THEY?

The Soviet Union, of course, like the U.S., stages reconnaissance and spy-satellite flights over China. But these flights do not really dispel the mystery, as a recent, rather amusing exchange between a CIA man and a KGB man in Washington suggests.

The two met at a diplomatic reception. The CIA man, a China specialist, knew that the KGB man specialized in the same field (the identity of the KGB men under diplomatic cover is, of course, known to the CIA). After a bit of chit-chat, the CIA man brought up a subject that has mystified the CIA—the large numbers of big, beehive-shaped installations that appear in reconnaissance pictures of North China. The CIA knows they are not missile installations, but has no clue to what they really are.

The CIA man asked casually whether the KGB man had noticed these curious objects. But of course, the KGB man replied, somewhat nettled—and proved it by displaying detailed knowledge of what the beehives looked like, and where they were. And what, the CIA man asked even more casually, did his colleague think the purpose of the installations might be?

"But we have no idea—no idea at all," said the KGB man, with a mixture of indignation and chagrin. By the same token, Soviet intelligence has "no idea at all" of what Chinese intentions really are. This makes the Russians deeply uneasy and is an important element in the Russian fear of China.

The fourth and most important reason for the Russian fear of China is that, although they are more polite about it, Nikita Khrushchev's successors undoubtedly share Khrushchev's view that the Chinese Communist leaders are irrational—Khrushchev called them "madmen" and "maniacs."

There is, indeed, a lunatic quality about the Chinese Communists' ideological assault on the "Russian revisionists." Tass, the Russian news agency, collects examples of anti-Russian propaganda. One recent item concerned a 4-year-old girl who had been performing her "anti-revisionist dance" poorly, until inspired by the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung, when she became the best anti-revisionist dancer in her age group. The Russians would not worry very much about anti-revisionist dances if they were not aware that the Chinese Communists are acquiring more lethal means of expressing their hatred.

The Chinese, as the Russians know all too well, have acquired a respectable nuclear arsenal, have already deployed medium-range missiles, and are working hard on the second stage of a missile with the range to devastate European Russia. The Russians also know that the sacred Maoist doctrine holds that a thermonuclear war—a war which, in Khrushchev's phrase, would "leave the living envying the dead"—is not only inevitable but desirable, to assure the final triumph of Mao-style Communism.

SHARED FEAR

The Russians' fear of a nuclear-armed China was shared by President Kennedy even before the Chinese acquired nuclear weapons. In 1963, he mused aloud about "a government that has called for war, international war, in order to advance the final success of the Communist cause . . . you introduce into this mix nuclear weapons and [you have] a more dangerous situation than we've faced since the end of the second world war."

Before he died, President Kennedy had secretly ordered a study of the feasibility of a "surgical operation" to accomplish the "nuclear sterilization" of Communist China. Since the nuclear weapons have been introduced "into this mix," it is not very surprising that the Russians should have considered the same thing. Moreover, they are not the only people with reason to fear a nuclear-armed China. Fear of nuclear weapons in irrational hands is not an irrational fear.

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